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Abstract
Several states require owners to mitigate lead hazards in old houses with children
present. I estimate the mandates’ effects on housing markets. My empirical strategy
exploits differences by state, year, and housing vintage. The mandates decrease the
prices of old houses by 7.1 percent, acting as a large tax on owners. Moreover, fam-
ilies with children become 11.3 percent less likely to live in old houses. Increases
in rents for family-friendly houses suggest that the mandates have important distribu-
tional consequences. These findings are relevant for evaluating similar mandates such
as healthy homes standards.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 535,000 children born in
the US in the 2000s suffered from lead poisoning (Wheeler & Brown 2013), a condition that is
associated with reduced IQ (Ferrie et al. 2015) and educational attainment (Currie et al. 2014,
Reyes 2015b, Grönqvist et al. 2017) and an increased risk of criminal activity (Reyes 2007, 2015a,
Feigenbaum & Muller 2016, Grönqvist et al. 2017, Aizer & Currie 2019).1 Lead paint was exten-
sively used in the first half of the last century, until a growing recognition of these lead hazards
motivated its ban for residential purposes in 1978. HUD (2011) estimates that nationwide, lead
paint lingers in 5.5 million houses inhabited by small children, the population most at risk for
lead poisoning, resulting in lead hazards in 21 percent of houses with small children (Dewalt et al.
2015).2 Beginning in 1971, an increasing number of states mandated abatement, i.e., control of
lead hazards in older houses. Yet, abatement is expensive: Koppel & Koppel (1994) estimate that
it can cost between $500 and $40,000, depending on the extent of the lead hazard, and funding for
abatement is limited. Therefore, the mandates are analogous to a group-specific tax on buyers of
old houses (Gruber 1994).
This paper presents the first large-scale evidence on the effects of state abatement mandates on
the housing market, answering the following questions. Who bears the costs? And what are the
mandates’ effects on child exposure to lead hazards? I compare outcomes for new and old houses,
which are more likely to have lead hazards, within a state before and after a mandate’s introduction,
in a difference-in-differences framework that exploits identifying variation at the state-year-vintage
level. My empirical analysis proceeds in two steps: first, I focus on property values to assess the
incidence of the mandates on property owners; then, I analyze how the mandates affect which
homes different households live in, that is their allocation across houses. To estimate the effect
1This figure refers to children with blood lead levels (BLLs) above 5µg/dL. In 1991, the CDC defined BLLs≥
10μg/dL as the level of concern for children aged 1–5 years. Since 2012, the term “level of concern” has been replaced
with an upper reference interval value defined as the 97.5th percentile of BLLs in US children aged 1–5 years from
two consecutive cycles of National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), currently at 5µg/dL.
2Since the deleading of gasoline between 1973 and 1995, lead paint in houses built before the 1978 ban is the
major source of lead exposure in the United States.
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of the mandates on house values, I use sales data, collected by DataQuick from public deeds.
To assess how households’ allocation changes with the mandates, I use data from the American
Housing Survey (AHS). I examine multi- and single-family homes separately as a proxy for rental
and owner-occupied homes, respectively.34
The hedonic model for differentiated goods formalized by Rosen (1974) guides my empirical
analysis. Prior to the mandate, owners abate homes with low abatement costs, and households sort
into safe and hazardous homes based on their willingness to pay. The mandate requires owners to
further abate old houses in the presence of small children, even where it is not profitable. Thus,
the mandate imposes an expected tax, decreasing property values. Abated properties will recoup
their value over time and attract families with children as they are made lead-safe, while the value
of non-remediated properties will stay low. Yet, landlords may be able to shift the abatement costs
onto renters with small children via price discrimination, or may avoid renting to these households,
decreasing the probability of abatement and the share of households with small children in old
homes.5 Therefore, long-term effects of the mandates can shed light on compliance rates in the
absence of abatement data. In addition, the mandate may spread novel information on the riskiness
of certain homes, steering families with small children away from old houses. A supply-side
response like price discrimination will increase rents in old homes for families with small children,
while a demand-side information shock would decrease those rents. Therefore, movements in
rental prices can provide suggestive evidence in favor of supply- or demand-side mechanisms.
The transaction data show that the costs imposed by the mandates are reflected into lower house
prices, although the mandates do not affect sales. Both old multi- and old single-family houses fall
in value by 7.1 percent for as long as ten years. These large reductions in prices can be rationalized
noting that even if a home does not present an immediate lead hazard, costly maintenance practices
3Results for multi- and single-family houses mirror results for rental and owner-occupied homes, respectively.
4In this paper I refer to dwellings as homes or houses. In the analysis, the transaction data are at the property level,
while in the AHS each unit constitutes an observation.
5Audit and correspondence studies have shown that when looking for housing, minority households are shown
homes in areas with lower levels of environmental amenities (Christensen & Timmins 2018, Christensen et al. 2020).
Further anecdotal evidence suggests that some landlords might discriminate against families with small children to
avoid incurring these abatement costs (Berman et al. 2013, Williams 2010).
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are needed to avoid future hazards and that reduction in prices may reduce further investments.
The allocation data show that prior to the mandates, high-income families with small children
disproportionally live in new houses, consistent with willingness to avoid lead hazards.6 For a few
years after a mandate, families with small children are 11.3 percent less likely to live in old houses
than before.
The decrease in both the value of old houses and the likelihood that families with small chil-
dren live in these old houses after a mandate is consistent with low rates of abatement. Under a low
abatement scenario, the mandates may decrease the probability that families with small children
live in old houses through both demand- and supply-side channels. On the demand side, novel
information about lead hazards may decrease demand for old houses by families with small chil-
dren, leading to decreases in rents for old, family-friendly houses. On the supply side, landlords
may charge higher rents or avoid renting to families with small children, translating into increases
in rents for old, family-friendly houses. Consistent with supply-side adjustments, rents for old
family-friendly houses appear to increase by 3.1-3.9 percent after a mandate.
These findings suggest that assessing the net impact of the abatement mandates requires fully
characterizing changes in the market equilibrium, in line with the literature on the unintended
consequences of mandates (Summers 1989, Gruber 1994, MaCurdy & McIntyre 2001). As house-
holds sort into homes and neighborhoods based on their utility and budget constraint (Tracey &
Walsh 2008, Kahn 2000), they implicitly select their pollution exposure, which affects long-term
outcomes (Currie et al. 2011, Cohen-Cole 2006, Evans 2006, Gazze 2016). Banzhaf et al. (2019)
discuss how these demand side forces, as well as supply-side considerations and political economy
factors may result in higher exposure levels for households of low socioeconomic status. In the
context of lead poisoning, the principal-agent problem inherent in the landlord-tenant relation may
lead to lower investments in remediation and even discrimination (Davis 2011b). By analyzing
the effects of the mandates on housing values, housing allocation, and rental prices, I shed light
on how these mechanisms interact. Moreover, Banzhaf et al. (2019) highlight how the ecological
6In the paper, I use the term families to refer to households.
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fallacy may lead to measurement issues: because old houses coexist in the same neighborhood
with newer homes, my granular data is key to correctly measure differential exposure risk. The
estimates in this paper can be extrapolated to evaluate similar policy proposals, such as changes in
housing standards and requirements for healthy homes.
This paper contributes to a growing literature studying lead poisoning prevention policies.
First, Aizer et al. (2018) show that Rhode Island’s abatement mandate for all rental properties
successfully decreased lead poisoning. My state-by-state analysis shows that Rhode Island is the
only state where the mandate increased property values, suggesting that the state’s lead-safe cer-
tificate model is particularly effective at spurring abatement. Second, Billings & Schnepel (2017)
find that federally-funded lead remediations increase home values and have tremendous returns
on investments. By showing that unfunded remediation mandates decrease property values and
fail to attract families with children into old homes, my findings suggest that liquidity constraints
might prevent some landlords from undertaking beneficial investments. Third, Bae (2012) and Bae
(2016) find that the federal mandate to disclose information about lead hazards to potential buyers
and renters appears to increase buyers’ testing at sale and reduce purchases of old homes among
families with small children, but has seemingly no effect on the value of old houses. My finding
that abatement mandates decrease the value of old houses may be due to property owners perceiv-
ing a higher cost of the abatement than the disclosure mandate or to methodological differences
in the studies. By analyzing state mandates that are implemented at different points in time, I can
control for localized time trends.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a hedonic model to show that an abatement
mandate conditional on residents’ characteristics decreases property values and may affect the
housing market allocation. Section 3 provides background on the mandates studied in this paper
and describes the data I use. Section 4 estimates the impact of the mandates on house prices, the
allocation of households across houses, and rents. Section 5 concludes with policy implications.
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2 A Model of Abatement Mandates
This section characterizes the housing market responses to the introduction of an abatement man-
date in the context of the hedonic model for differentiated goods formalized by Rosen (1974). Like
an environmental standard, a mandate effectively rations the availability of leaded homes, improv-
ing the average quality of old homes. Unlike other environmental cleanups, lead abatement man-
dates are unfundend and group-specific, that is they cover houses with children. Because cleanup
costs fall on property owners, the mandates may reduce property values. Because the incidence of
group-specific mandated benefits depends on the group’s valuation of the benefit (Gruber 1994), a
mandate may decrease the share of families with small children living in old houses through either
supply-side responses, including price discrimination or refusal to rent to families with small chil-
dren, or demand-side responses to updated beliefs about the consequences and prevalence of lead
hazards in old homes. Here, I discuss how supply-side responses imply increases in rental prices
for families with small children, while demand-side responses imply lower rental prices.
I consider a closed housing market with two types of renters, households with and without
children, and two types of otherwise identical houses, leaded and lead-free homes in fixed sup-
ply.7 Households without children do not care about lead safety and choose the cheapest available
homes. Households with children have different willingness to pay for lead safety depending on
their budget constraint. New homes are lead-free. Owners of old homes can voluntarily abate lead
hazards at heterogeneous costs. These costs may depend on owners’ characteristics, such as credit
access, or home characteristics, which I abstract from here. Absent a mandate, a fraction of old
homes may be abated such that the market for leaded and lead-safe homes clear, and the rent for
leaded homes is weakly lower than the rent for lead-safe homes. Families without children live in
leaded homes, as it is cheaper and they do not value lead-safety. Families with children sort into
lead-free homes according to their willingness to pay. By revealed preferences, remaining leaded
homes have abatement costs that are higher than the present value of the rent premium for a safe
7The conclusions from this model carry through if houses differ with respect to other characteristics, potentially
correlated with lead presence. The extent of this correlation would however determine relative elasticities.
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home. The average value of old properties equals the average present value of the stream of rents
for leaded and lead-safe homes, weighted by the share of old homes that are leaded and lead-safe,
respectively.
2.1 The Mandate Equilibrium
Unexpectedly, the government introduces an unfunded abatement mandate requiring a random
fraction of leaded houses to be abated conditional on occupancy by a small child. The extent of
abatement required will depend on local enforcement. I discuss the effects of the mandate on
property values, rents, and sorting of households into leaded and lead-safe homes. Because I do
not observe whether old homes are lead-safe in the data, I consider the mandate’s effect on old
homes in general.
Property Values. This mandate is analogous to a tax on leaded properties that is levied on
the buyer. Thus, the value of these properties falls by an amount equal to the difference between
abatement cost and the present value of the rent premium for a safe home, which is positive by
revealed preferences. Hence, the average value of old homes declines, too.
Rents. Newly abated homes drive rents for lead-safe homes down, depending on the relative
elasticities of demand and supply.
Allocation. The mandate can affect sorting by shifting demand for old abated houses by fam-
ilies with small children. Marginal households with children move to lead-safe homes, including
newly abated old homes. Thus, the share of high-income households with children in old homes
may increase.
Summing up, this simple framework suggests that after a mandate, old properties sell at lower
prices. Moreover, abatement increases the supply of lead-safe relative to leaded homes, decreasing
the relative rent for lead-safe homes and increasing the share of households with children in old,
newly abated homes.
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2.2 Information, Price Discrimination, and Housing Supply Elasticity
So far, the model assumes perfect information about the dangers and prevalence of lead hazards,
uniform pricing, and fixed housing supply. Here, I discuss the implications of relaxing these as-
sumptions.
First, a mandate can act as an information shock if some households are not fully informed
about lead hazards in homes. For example, discussions of the mandate in the media may explain
the health effects of lead exposure and may highlight which homes are more likely to have lead
hazards. Such an information shock would decrease demand for leaded homes by families with
small children, causing both rents and prices of old homes to fall, and decreasing the share of
households with children in old homes in the short run, until property owners abate some old
homes and the market converges to a new equilibrium. While it is difficult to disentangle the
information content of the mandates empirically, I explore this issue in Section 4.1.2.
Second, the mandates increase the marginal cost to rent a leaded house to a family with a
small child because the child’s presence might trigger abatement. If landlords are able to price
discriminate based on family status, they will charge families with small children a premium to
live in old houses. Even if rental listings include fixed posted prices, price-discrimination can
still occur during the negotiation phase. This price discrimination would move the equilibrium
allocation along the demand curve to a point with fewer families with children in old houses and
higher rents for these families. This pattern may be especially pronounced among low-income
households who may be less able to defend their tenants’ rights.
Summing up, on the one hand the mandate may decrease rents in leaded homes if it increases
the salience of lead hazards and decreases demand for leaded homes. On the other hand, the
mandate may increase rents in leaded homes, acting as a rationing force, and especially so in
market segments targeted at families with children that enable price discrimination. Thus, changes
in rents can help distinguish between changes in the housing allocation due to shifts in demand and
those due to supply-side responses such as price discrimination. Section 4.3 explores the extent to
which the mandates increase rental prices differentially for old family-friendly homes.
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This simple framework assumes fixed housing supply and population. In reality, new construc-
tions can replace old homes or expand housing supply. A mandate may push otherwise durable old
homes at the upper tail of the distribution of abatement cost out of the market by making it more
profitable to demolish them and build new ones. Thus, land availability and the elasticity of supply
of new housing likely mediate the effects of the mandate: in areas with a more inelastic housing
supply, the same shock will have a stronger effect on prices. Similarly, underlying population
trends may magnify or attenuate the effects of the mandate. For example, in shrinking cities where
exising homes are already in excess supply, falling prices of old homes following a mandate are
less likely to spur substitute new construction, implying larger price declines for old homes than
in growing areas (Glaeser & Gyourko 2005). Section 4.2 investigates the role of housing market
characteristics in mediating the mandates’ effects.
3 Background and Data
3.1 Regulatory History of Lead Paint
The incidence of lead paint in the current housing stock increases with structures’ age: the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development estimates that 87 percent of houses built before 1940 in
the US have lead paint, compared to 69 percent for houses built between 1940 and 1959 and 24
percent for houses built between 1960 and 1977 (HUD, 2011). Starting in the late 19th century,
paint contained up to 50 percent lead by weight to increase its durability (Reissman et al. 2001).
In the 1950s, the growing body of evidence of the harm associated with lead induced some man-
ufacturers to voluntarily reduce the lead content of paint to 1 percent, a level that can still induce
severe lead poisoning (Hammitt et al. 1999).8 Finally, in June 1977, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission lowered the allowed level of lead in paint to 0.06 percent, effectively banning lead
paint for residential purposes. Still, the ban does not cover the pre-existing housing stock, although
8Meanwhile, the use of lead paints for interior decoration also decreased. Therefore, houses built after 1950 are
more likely to only have lead paint on exterior surfaces. Exterior lead paint can still constitute a hazard for children
because lead dust deposits in the soil outside the home and can be ingested when children play outside.
9
3.1 Regulatory History of Lead Paint 3 BACKGROUND AND DATA
lead remains in a house indefinitely unless it is carefully removed (Mushak & Crocetti 1990).
When paint surfaces deteriorate, residents, and especially children, are exposed to health haz-
ards from lead-contaminated dust. Lead dust enters the human system through ingestion or in-
halation. Small children are especially exposed to lead-contaminated dust from paint and win-
dowsills due to normal hand-to-mouth activity (Fee 1990). Moreover, lead is most damaging to
small children: they absorb and retain more lead than adults and their neurological development is
particularly susceptible to neurotoxins (see, e.g., McCabe 1979).
As of today, 19 states have enacted mandates that require abatement of lead hazards on interior
and exterior surfaces.9 For the empirical analysis, it is crucial that the timing of the mandates is
uncorrelated with unobservable housing market trends that could confound the estimated impact
of the regulations. Table 1 shows that states introduced lead abatement mandates in three waves.10
Early adopters such as Massachusetts and New Jersey started regulating lead abatement in the
1970s, when lead paint made the national agenda. A second wave of states, such as Connecticut,
introduced mandates in the 1990s, when new medical evidence led the CDC to lower the poisoning
threshold to 10 µg/dL. Finally, more states such as Rhode Island, Ohio, and Michigan introduced
abatement mandates in the 2000s, when the CDC started requiring states receiving funding for
lead poisoning prevention activities to “develop and implement strategic childhood lead poisoning
elimination plans” (CDC, 2005). In the empirical analysis, I formally assess the validity of the
identifying assumption of parallel trends. Moreover, Appendix Figure C.1 shows no evidence of a
correlation between the timing of the mandates and trends in construction, population, or GDP.
These mandates differ in terms of their coverage, what triggers a lead order, and type of abate-
ment required, as summarized in Table 1. Irrespective of the mandates’ details, if the owner fails
to abate, residents have several protection measures to enforce their right to abatement, from rent
9At a more localized level, city governments may also enact regulations. While these local initiatives likely
cause heterogeneity in treatment effects, the lack of systematic information on local laws does not allow me to study
these differences more in depth. To the extent that the timing of these city-level regulations is not correlated with
the introduction of the state-level mandates, the absence of local data does not affect the validity of my estimates of
average treatment effects.
10Regulations were identified with a search through LexisNexis and Westlaw.
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withholding to lawsuit in housing courts that can result in high fines.11 In the main analysis, I
estimate the average treatment effect of these mandates by pooling all states together to exploit the
exogeneity of the timing of the mandates across states.
3.2 Data
I combine two data sources to analyze the impact of the mandates on house prices, housing alloca-
tion, and rents.
Housing Prices. To assess the impact of the mandates on home values, I analyze price data
at the transaction level obtained from the DataQuick data repository.12 This is a dataset of public
records of property sales (e.g., price, date, mortgage type) from 1988 until 2012 and of property
characteristics collected from the most recent publicly available tax assessment and deeds records
from municipalities across the US. The assessor file includes details on the physical characteristics
(e.g., square footage, number of bathrooms, number of stories, year built), use type (e.g., residen-
tial, commercial, single-family, condominium, tenancy), and street address for every property in
the covered counties. I choose this data source for two reasons. First, the granularity of these data
allows me to control for census tract fixed effects that restrict the comparison of outcomes across
houses in the same neighborhood. Second, sales data provide a more precise estimate of the value
of a property than assessed values or survey data; however, if the mandates affect the rate at which
old houses are transacted, the estimates of mandates’ effect on prices will suffer from selection
bias. Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2 show that while the mandates affect the probability of sale of
multi-family homes, houses transacted before and after the mandate appear to be similar. Thus, I
conclude that selection bias is not a concern in this context.
Based on the assessor file, the data cover approximately 90 percent of housing structures na-
tionwide, although different counties enter the sample in different years, as shown in Appendix
11In addition, partial funding in the form of loans and grants might be available for low-income property owners
wishing to abate lead hazards, although most resources are restricted to homeowners.
12I accessed the data repository, housed at the Taubman Center for State and Local Government at the Harvard
Kennedy School, during a visiting period under the Exchange Scholar Program.
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Figure B.1. Columns 2-3 of Table 1 show that six implementing states are covered both before and
after they introduce a mandate, namely, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio,
and Rhode Island. The 2.5 million transactions in these states provide the identifying variation
for the empirical analysis, while the other implementing states help estimate trends. Connecticut,
Michigan, Ohio, and Rhode Island have enough pre-mandate observations to assess the validity
of the parallel trends assumption, with a total of 2 million transactions. My main findings rely
on the differential timing of the mandates across states for identification, and are robust to using
a more balanced panel and to dropping any one of these states, as discussed below. Moreover,
coverage in the DataQuick repository appears to be only mildly correlated with measures of the
state regulatory context used in the literature (Gyourko & Molloy 2014), assuaging the concern
that transaction data are only available for states with more stringent lead laws.
In the empirical analysis, I study the effect of the mandates on house prices separately for
rentals and owner-occupied properties. In the assessor file, I infer that a house is owner-occupied
if the owner’s mailing address is the same as the property address. However, tenancy decisions are
likely endogenous. Hence, my preferred specification splits the sample on a fixed characteristic of
the house, i.e., I separate single- and multi-family homes and interpret the findings for multi-family
homes as proxies for rentals.13
Allocation and Rents. To analyze the impact of the mandates on occupancy and rents, I use the
AHS National Sample, years 1985-2011. The AHS is a biennial panel of housing units, i.e., sur-
veyors visit the same houses in each wave, and it includes a vast array of property characteristics,
including binned construction year, as well as household demographics and tenure duration. Un-
fortunately, the public use data only provide MSA identifiers and not state identifiers. Therefore,
I drop observations in MSAs that cross state borders, since the mandates are state-level policies,
resulting in 211,994 observations in 36 states. Column 4 of Table 1 reports which implementing
states are in the AHS sample. Among those states, the ones that implement a mandate after 1985
provide the identifying source of variation for the empirical analysis.
13Appendix Table C.3 shows that my main findings hold when splitting the sample based on tenancy.
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Comparison of the two datasets. Appendix Table B.1 compares the characteristics of the
housing stock in the DataQuick and the AHS data sets. These samples appear similar in terms of
the size of the housing units, as well as house values and age of the housing stock.
4 Empirical Analysis
I estimate the effect of the mandates on housing markets by comparing outcomes for old and new
houses within a state before and after a mandate, stacking observations across states. This setting
yields a difference-in-differences (DD) design where old houses belong to the treated group while
new houses are not affected by the mandates. The identifying variation for this analysis is at
the state-year-vintage level for states that implement a mandate during the sample period. In the
hedonic model, the value of a house is a log-linear function of housing characteristics. Thus, I
estimate the effect of the abatement mandates on prices and allocation by fitting the following
equation:
Yivst = βMandatest ∗Oldvs+piXit+γsv+δtv+ηst + εivst (1)
where Yivst is an outcome for house i of vintage v, in state s and year t, Mandatest is an indicator
for year t being the year of the mandate’s introduction in state s or any year thereafter, Oldvs is
an indicator for houses targeted by the mandate, Xit is a vector of potentially time-varying house
characteristics and local amenities, and δtv, γsv, and ηst are year-vintage, state-vintage, and state-
year fixed effects respectively. Specifically, Oldvs equals one for houses built before 1978 in every
state but Maryland where the mandate targets only houses built before 1950. Vintage refers to
century of construction for houses built in the 1700s and 1800s and to decade for the 1900s.14
The controls included in Xit vary depending on the sample. One the one hand, the panel
nature of the AHS sample allows me to control for unit fixed effects, improving the precision of
my estimates.15 On the other hand, the richness of the transaction sample allows me to include
14In the AHS sample I drop houses built after 2000, as they only appear in less than half of the panel years.
15In alternative specifications, I include fixed effects for number of units, stories and rooms in the property.
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tract-year and tract-vintage fixed effects that replace the respective state-level interactions. The
introduction of tract fixed effects restricts the analysis to the comparison of old and new houses
within a small area with a population of less than 10,000 individuals.16 In addition, tract-vintage
fixed effects control for local variation in the characteristics of the housing stock built at different
times. For instance, local availibility of natural gas determines the heating fuel of houses built at a
given point in time (Davis & Kilian 2011, Myers 2019).17
By including state-year or tract-year fixed effects, I control non-parametrically for state-specific
or tract-specific trends in the housing market that may be correlated with the introduction of the
mandates. Correlation would arise, for instance, if changes in amenities, such as urban flight and
urban decay, which are associated with decreasing house values, lead to poorly maintained houses,
and hence higher lead hazards and a stronger push to enact preventative regulations. Alternatively,
a correlation could arise if salience of lead paint hazards in old homes increases with the state-level
phase-out of leaded gasoline. The setback of this specification is that I cannot estimate the effect
of the mandates on the level of prices, i.e., the potential spillovers of the policies on new houses.
The internal validity of the DD framework hinges on the assumption that old and new houses
are on parallel trends prior to the mandates, i.e. the timing of the mandates is uncorrelated with
the error term conditional on the control variables. This would be violated, for instance, if the
mandates were systematically accompanied by revitalization programs targeted differentially at
old houses. Section 3.1 discusses how the timing of the mandates appears to follow advancements
in the medical knowledge around lead exposure. To verify the plausibility of the parallel trends
assumption, I estimate a year-by-year version of the DD, as in the following equation, and present
16There is considerable variation in the age of the housing stock even within such small areas: in my sample, half
of the tracts have between 31 and 89 percent of houses built before 1978.
17Appendix Figure C.2 shows that there is no sharp discontinuity in the shares of houses that are gas-heated or
oil-heated around the year 1978. In particular, these shares are mostly constant in the 1970s and the early 1980s.
Appendix Table C.4 shows that my results are robust to focusing on houses built in a small window of years around
1978, confirming that my findings are not driven by spurious fluctuations in fuel prices.
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plots of the leads, αy, and lags, βy, of the mandates’ effect on old houses:
Yivst =
Tmin
∑
y=1
αyPret−y,s ∗Oldv+
Tmax
∑
y=0
βyPostt+y,s ∗Oldv+piXit+γsv+δtv+ηst + εivst (2)
This section analyzes the effect of the mandates on sale prices (Section 4.1) and the housing
market allocation (Section 4.2). Then, Section 4.3 relates the change in house values and allocation
to the effect of the mandates on rents for houses with different characteristics to provide suggestive
evidence on the mechanisms driving the observed housing market allocation.
4.1 Sale Prices
I estimate the effect of the mandates on sale prices in the DataQuick sample separately for the
rental and owner-occupied market as proxied by multi- and single-family homes, respectively. The
model in Section 2 predicts that an abatement mandate reduces the value of old homes as owners
had opted not to abate absent the mandate. I use the natural logarithm of price per square foot
as my preferred outcome as remediation costs are generally proportional to square footage. This
is equivalent to using log price on the left-hand side and controlling for log square footage on
the right-hand side, and indeed Column 6 of Appendix Table C.5 shows that the estimated price
effects are robust to using log price on the left-hand side and controlling for a quadratic polynomial
of square footage.
Figure 1 plots year-by-year DD estimates from a version of equation (2) that controls for tract-
year fixed effects: abatement mandates erode the value of older homes relative to newer ones, both
for multi-family (left panel) and single-family houses (right panel). In both panels, the relative
price of old houses is fairly constant up to several years prior to the mandate, and it falls signif-
icantly after the mandate. Table 2 presents the corresponding point estimates for old multi- and
single-family houses: after a mandate, both types of houses fall in value by 7.1 percent on average
(Column 1), a result that is not driven by pre-existing trends (Column 2) and is robust to control-
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ling for house characteristics or house fixed effects (Columns 3-4).18 Consistent with lead hazards
being more prevalent in houses built in the first half of the 20th century, Figure 2 shows that the
effect of the mandate is stronger for older vintages.
Figure 1 shows a persistent depreciation of old houses after the introduction of a mandate,
a finding that is not consistent with high abatement rates in the average state in response to the
regulations. This persistent effect may be in part due to building and demolition patterns in each
neighborhood, as Figure 2 shows that after the mandates, houses built in the 1990s appear to in-
crease in value relative to houses built in the 1980s.19 Moreover, heterogeneous effects across
states related to heterogeneity in the mandates’ implementation could shed further light on remedi-
ation rates. To this end, Appendix Table C.8 shows the effects of the individual mandates in the four
states where data are available for several years both before and after the regulations, Connecticut,
Michigan, Ohio, and Rhode Island. Importantly, these regressions do not control for vintage-level
trends, which are absorbed in the regressions that pool all states together. Rhode Island exhibits a
unique pattern: old properties appear to increase in value for six years after the mandate. Rhode
Island distinguishes itself among implementing states also for high screening rates, 80 percent for
three-year-old children, and the related high compliance rates with the mandate: the total number
of lead-safe certificates issued to landlords increased from 333 to 47,734 between 1997 and 2010
(Aizer et al. 2018). Unfortunately, there is little reliable data on inspections and remediations in
other states to establish a direct link between remediation rates in each state and housing prices.
My estimates of the losses in house values are quite large: prices of old multi-family houses
drop by $5.49 per square foot on average, in the same order of magnitude as abatement costs, im-
plying a high perceived probability of abatement and high pass-through rates to sellers, especially
considering that not all pre1978 homes have lead hazards.2021 Billings & Schnepel (2017) find
18Appendix Table C.6 shows qualitatively similar results using self-reported housing values for owner-occupied
homes in the AHS data, the data used in Bae (2016).
19The relative point estimates are shown in Appendix Table C.7.
20Nationwide data on HUD-funded remediations for the period 2001-2018 indicate that these remediation projects
cost $7,250 on average. Pre-1978 homes in my sample measure 1,566 square feet on average, implying an average
abatement cost of $4.64 per square foot. I consider this an underestimate of abatement costs since HUD grants are
only available to low-income households who might choose cheaper remediation projects.
21These estimates are in line with the literature on the capitalization of pollution and school investments (Currie
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that federally-funded lead remediations increase home values in Charlotte, NC, by $20,000, with
a 179 percent return on investment. Both the estimates by Billings & Schnepel (2017) and the
large response of house prices to the mandate I estimate in this section are a puzzle under rational
expectations, even when one considers the high costs associated with lead poisoning lawsuits.22 It
is worth noting, however, that the observed average abatement cost is an underestimate of the true
abatement cost, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, we only observe abatement costs condi-
tional on abatement, meaning that observed costs belong to the lowest tail of the cost distribution.
On the other hand, the observed abatement cost does not take into account the cost of funding for
abatement projects, the psychic costs of interacting with government bureaucracy, or the opportu-
nity cost of rent missed during abatement. Moreover, the mandates might foster maintenance and
costly avoidance behavior, imposing a liability on these homes even when they do not get abated.
4.1.1 Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks
Older houses transacted up to three years after a mandate lose 2.4 percent relative to newer homes
in their census tract, and the loss in value is over 10 percent in later years (Table 2: Column 2).
This lagged effect is surprising: owners should immediately internalize the costs induced by the
mandate. Three potential explanations can help rationalize this lagged effect. First, low baseline
child lead screening rates could explain delayed compliance and enforcement. As more children
are screened over time, the mandates gain bite and the probability that an owner has to abate in-
creases. Second, federal requirements concerning abatement and renovation work on old homes
became more stringent over time, thus increasing costs. For example, in 2008 the Environmental
Protection Agency passed regulations requiring contractors working on pre1978 homes to acquire
certification of lead safe practices. Third, the mandates may induce lower investments in mainte-
nance and renovations in older homes in anticipation of lower resale values, which contribute to
et al. 2015, Greenstone & Gallagher 2008, Gamper-Rabindran & Timmins 2013, Davis 2011a, Muehlenbachs et al.
2015, Bartik et al. 2019, Cellini et al. 2010).
22The settlements for these lawsuits are often in the millions, as reported by the media. However, no systematic
data exists from housing courts on the number of lawsuits initiated against landlords.
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increasingly lower home values over time.23 For example after a mandate, owners of old homes
might find it less profitable to invest in child-friendly amenities or house expansions.
While I cannot disentangle the role of these potential explanations of the lagged and persistent
mandate effects, I can rule out that two potential confounding factors drive this lagged effect: 1)
the unbalanced nature of my data panel and 2) filtering. First, Appendix Figure C.3 shows that
using a balanced sample including all untreated states covered since 1988 and only those treated
states with price data for at least one year prior to seven years after the introduction of a mandate
produces very similar estimates to those plotted in Figure 1. Second, homes might depreciate over
time as the housing stock expands through a down-filtering process in a way that is not captured by
the vintage-year fixed effects in my specification (Lowry 1960, Rosenthal 2014). Appendix Figure
C.4 rejects that filtering is the main driver of the effects estimated in Figure 1 by showing no effect
of these placebo mandates on prices in untreated states.
More broadly, within-city trends such as the decline of inner city neighborhoods, differential
effects of the 2008 housing crisis, or gentrification might confound my findings. The inclusion
of tract-year fixed effects in my preferred specifications and the reliance on the different timing
of the mandates in different states ensure that local trends are not the main drivers of the results.
Moreover, Appendix Figure C.5 replicates Figure 1 on the subsample of transactions that happen
prior to the 2008 crisis, showing that my findings are not driven by stronger effects of the 2008
housing crisis on older homes.
A further concern in interpreting the effect of the mandates on prices is that the mandates might
change the composition of houses that are transacted. For example, the price decline observed for
old houses could be due to an increase in the supply of lower quality old houses. Appendix Tables
C.1 and C.2 show that while the mandates affect the probability of sale of multi-family homes,
houses transacted before and after the mandate appear to be similar. Therefore, selection does not
appear to be driving the results in Table 2.
Finally, Appendix Tables C.5 and C.9 confirm that the results in Panel A of Table 2 are gener-
23See Billings (2015) for an example of how increased property values to due light rail transit improvements led to
increased renovation activity in Charlotte, NC.
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ally robust to both different samples, e.g. including only treated states or only states that are also in
the AHS, and different specifications, including allowing for state-vintage specific linear trends.24
4.1.2 The Role of Information
In this section, I investigate the likelihood that the mandate acts as an information shock by ex-
ploring heterogeneous effects based on buyers’ characteristics, such as the likelihood of the buyer
having a child and a proxy for the buyer’s information about lead hazards.
Families with small children or planning to have small children, may be both more aware of the
mandates and the costs linked to these regulations and perceive a higher likelihood of enforcement.
Then, neighborhoods with more families with small children would see the largest drops in the
price of old houses. Table 3 shows that census tracts that had a higher share of children in 1980
indeed see larger decreases in the value of old homes after the mandates. Specifically, old houses
in tracts in the first quartile of the distribution of children residents depreciate by 4%. These tracts
have on average 4.7 children over 100 residents. Doubling the share of children to 9.2 in the
third quartile almost doubles the negative effect of the mandate on old houses by an additional 3.2
percentage points. However, this relationship does not appear to be linear at the highest tail of the
distribution, which cautions from interpreting the share of children in a census tract as the mere
probability of mandate enforcement.
To investigate the role of awareness of lead hazards and of the mandates’ requirements further,
I construct a measure of buyers’ knowledge of lead paint hazards based on the buyers’ origin. I
hypothesize that buyers from states where lead paint is more prevalent and states that eventually
introduce mandates are more likely to know about lead hazards and about the obligations attached
to mandates. I determine a buyer’s residence at the time of the purchase by matching the buyer’s
name to a seller’s name in another transaction in the DataQuick sample within a three year window
through a fuzzy match.25 I obtain a linked sample of 2.84 million observations. By construction,
24Limiting the sample to implementing states only reduces the estimated price effects. This is likely because
the fixed effects for vintage by transaction year estimated on this smaller sample differ, potentially indicating that
idiosyncratic variation within these states gets too much weight in the smaller sample.
25I restrict the match by blocking on first and last initials.
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the matching algorithm excludes first-time home-owners, who may be more likely to start a family.
The sample selection may explain why the mandate’s effects estimated on this sample (Table 4,
Column 1) are an order of magnitude smaller than the effects in the full sample, which caveats
the results from this exercise. Nonetheless, Columns 2-5 of Table 4 suggests that the negative
effects of the mandates on old houses are driven primarily by transactions in which the buyer
comes from a high-knowledge state. This finding suggests that the effect of the mandates on the
value of old homes cannot be explained solely by the mandates providing new information about
lead hazards and their prevalence. The mandates’ effects on rents, discussed in Section 4.3 below,
further support this interpretation.
4.2 Allocation
By affecting prices and housing quality, the mandates may also change the housing allocation, and
thus the distribution of exposure risk. Figure 3 shows that prior to the mandates, high-income
families with small children are less likely to live in old houses than other households. After
the mandates, fewer low- and middle-income families with small children live in old homes.26 To
confirm that these changes are indeed caused by the mandates, I compare household characteristics,
my outcome variables, in old and new houses before and after a mandate by estimating equation
(1) with unit fixed effects in the AHS sample.
Table 5 finds 11.3 percent fewer families with small children in old houses after a mandate
(Column 1).27 In contrast, Column 5 shows that people over 59 years of age are no less likely to
live in old houses, and if anything, they replace families with small children.28 The probability
that a small child lives in an old house after a mandate decreases even more for families with
income below the median, by 24 percent (Column 2).29 While these results do not support the
26Appendix Table C.10 describes the average households in old and new houses before and after mandate.
27Notably, the findings in this section do not require households to move at higher rates after the mandates. In the
AHS, on average over 50 percent of households with small children move in each wave: the mandates could steer
some of these movers to new houses rather than old ones. Appendix Table C.11 shows some evidence of increased
turnover in multi-family units the first years after a mandate, but this effect fades 4 years after the mandate.
28Appendix Table C.12 shows that the results in this section are robust to different specifications.
29Accordingly, Appendix Table C.13 shows that the mandates affect occupancy in multi-family houses the most.
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hypothesis that the mandates spur abatement, they are compatible with landlords discriminating
against families with small children, as discussed in Section 2.2.
Plotting period-by-period estimates from equation (2), Figure 4 shows that the effect of the
mandates on allocation fades after five years. As the depreciation of old houses after a mandate
is more persistent (Figure 1), increasing abatement over time cannot explain families with small
children returning to old homes, as it would also increase housing values. A potential explanation
is that the mandates temporarily increase the salience of lead hazards: salience induces families
with small children to sort out of old homes, yet buyers of old properties continue to factor in
future abatement costs independently of their family status and reduce investments in upkeep of
these old homes. Related, Billings & Schnepel (2017) find that owners in Charlotte, NC, appear to
invest more in renovations after they abate lead hazards.
A second potential explanation for the temporary allocation effects is that, as the price of old
houses declines over time as a result of the mandates, families with small children are willing
to accept the risk of lead hazards, moving along the demand curve. Then, markets with a more
inelastic housing supply, where price effects are larger, should also see smaller adjustments on
the allocation margin, as discussed in Section 2.2. Using data on the elasticity of housing supply
from Saiz (2010) and tract-level population counts from the Census, Table 6 shows suggestive
evidence in favor of this hypothesis. It is important to note, however, that the AHS sample may be
underpowered for this analysis, especially as most MSAs in the sample show positive population
growth at the time of the mandate’s introduction.
4.3 Rents
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 show that the mandates lower the value of old houses and that fewer families
with small children live in old houses after a mandate. What explains this sorting pattern? Do
owners shift part of the burden of the mandates to tenants in the form of higher rents? Section 2.2
discusses how an information shock would lower demand for old houses by families with small
children and result in lower rents for old houses. Alternatively, price discrimination may lead to
21
5 CONCLUSION
higher rents for families with small children living in old houses. To disentangle these mechanisms,
I estimate equation (1) in the AHS sample controlling for unit fixed effects.
First, Table 7 shows no evidence that the mandates increase rents for old houses overall. This
finding can be due to the fact that new owners purchased homes at lower prices, and therefore do not
need to pass on abatement costs. However, this null result can also mask important heterogeneity
if some homes see rent increases and other see rent decreases. Alternatively, disproportionate exit
of old homes from the rental market after a mandate could exert upward pressure on rental prices.
Appendix Table C.14 show no effect of the mandates on the probability that an old unit in a multi-
family house is rented or on rental prices.30 In contrast, the mandates appear to deter owners of old
single-family houses from renting them out, although the estimates are quite imprecise, leading to
a temporary increase in rents for these houses.
Second, I identify homes that are attractive to families with small children based on fixed char-
acteristics, such as the number of bedrooms or the presence of a small child at baseline (year 1985).
Table 7 shows suggestive evidence that rents for family-friendly homes increase after a mandate,
albeit the standard errors are quite large and estimates change signs in Columns 6-7. Specifically,
rents for old family-friendly homes appear to increase by between 3.1 and 3.9 percent, or $234-295
yearly (Columns 4 and 8, the most stringent specifications), although I cannot reject that rents for
old and new family-friendly homes increase by the same amount. These findings are consistent
with supply-side price adjustments limited to family-friendly houses, and are inconsistent with the
mandates decresing demand for old homes, as discussed in Section 2.2.31
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of lead abatement mandates on the housing market equilibrium in
a DD framework. I exploit the state-level variation in the timing of the mandates, as well as the
30In my sample, 57% of multi-family properties are not the owner’s primary residence.
31Appendix Table C.15 suggests renters with small children may increase total housing expenditure but the results
are not statistically significant.
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regulations’ focus on old houses and families with small children, to investigate 1) the mandates’
incidence, and 2) the mandates’ effect on children’s risk of lead exposure. First, owners of old
properties face a large cost, as the mandates decrease the value of old houses by $6.71 per square
foot, that is 84 percent of the abatement cost. Second, the mandates have ambiguous effects on
children’s exposure risk. On the one hand, fewer families with small children live in old homes up
to five years after a mandate. On the other hand, the persistent depreciation of old homes suggests
that abatement rates are low on average and that those children remaining in old homes may still
be exposed to lead hazards. Importantly, I lack comprehensive data to evaluate the welfare effects
of the mandates, including estimates of moving costs and actual abatement rates.
The targeted nature of the mandates aims to address the main issue with lead hazards in US
homes: as families with small children represent a small fraction of the population, it is neither
cost-effective nor feasible to require abatement of the entire US housing stock at once. Suggestive
evidence of increases in rents for old family-friendly homes implies that family with small children
may also bear part of the mandates’ costs. A flat rental registration fee for old properties such as the
Rhode Island system studied by Aizer et al. (2018) could restore efficiency if the revenues from the
fee were used to subsidize abatement in the presence of small children. In fact, the Rhode Island
mandate alone appears to increase the value of old houses in the state, suggesting that it might be
effective at inducing remedation. These findings are helpful in thinking about policy proposals to
regulate housing standards and healthy homes.
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Figure 1: Price Effects
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The figure plots DD coefficients on year-by-year mandate dummies, estimated on the DataQuick samples (1988-2012)
of multi- (left panel) and single-family (right panel) houses. Each census tract is weighted by 1980 population. The
outcome variable is the logarithm of the price per square foot. The vertical line indicates the introduction of the
mandate. For implementing states, the sample is limited to a [-6,10] window around the introduction of the mandates.
Tract-year, tract-vintage and vintage-year fixed effects are included. T-1 is the omitted category. The vertical bars are
95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level (42 clusters).
Figure 2: Price Effects, By Year of Construction
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Notes: The figure plots DD coefficients on year-by-year indicators for homes built 1800-1949, 1950-1977, and in
the 1990s relative to homes built 1978-1989, estimated on the DataQuick sample (1988-2012). Each census tract is
weighted by 1980 population. The outcome variable is the logarithm of the price per square foot. The vertical line
indicates the introduction of the mandate. T-1 is the omitted category. Tract-year, tract-vintage and old-year FE are
included.
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Figure 3: Sorting into Old Houses, By Income and Family Status
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Notes: The figure plots the share of families in the AHS sample with (red triangles) and without (blue dots) children
living in old houses in implementing states before (solid) and after (empty) the introduction of the mandates, by income
decile. The vertical bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. The sample is limited to houses built between 1950 and
1999.
Figure 4: Allocation Effects: Child Under Six
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The figure plots DD coefficients on two-year mandate dummies, estimated on the AHS sample (1985-2011). The
outcome variable is a dummy for the household having a child below six years of age. State-year, year-vintage,
month of interview and unit fixed effects are included. The vertical line indicates the introduction of the mandate.
T ∈ [−2,−1] is the omitted category. The vertical bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level (36 clusters).
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Table 1: State-Level Abatement Mandates
State
Enactment 
Year
DataQuick Start 
Year In AHS Rentals Only Trigger Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CT 1992 1988 Yes No <6 Year-old All
DC 1983 - No No <8 Year-old All
GA 2000 1998 (1 county) Yes Yes <6 Year-old with EBLL Multifamily >12 units
IL 1992 1996 Yes No Children All
KY 1974 2004 Yes No Children All
LA 1988 2012 Yes No <6 Year-old All
MA 1971 1988 Yes No <6 Year-old All
MD 1995 1997 Yes Yes N/A All
ME 1991 2005 No No <6 Year-old All
MI 2005 1991 Yes Yes N/A All
MN 1991 1998 No No Child with EBLL All
MO 1993 1998 No No <6 Year-old All
NC 1989 1988 Yes No <6 Year-old with EBLL All
NH 1993 1996 No Yes <6 Year-old with EBLL All
NJ 1971 1988 Yes No Children All
OH 2003 1996 Yes No <6 Year-old with EBLL All
RI 2002 1988 Yes Yes N/A All
SC 1979 1990 Yes No Children All
VT 1996 2002 No Yes N/A All
The table displays the timeline of the introduction of abatement mandates in the 19 implementing states. Columns 2 and 3 contrast the mandates’ enactment year
with the year in which the state appears in the DataQuick Sample. Column 4 indicates whether the state is included in the AHS sample. Columns 5, 6, 7 characterize
whether the mandate covers only rental homes, what triggers a lead order, and whether the type of buildings covered by the mandate.
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Table 2: Price Effects
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Multi-Family Properties
 -0.071  -0.070 
(0.017) (0.016)
 0.002
(0.019)
 -0.024  -0.026  -0.028 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.023)
 -0.100  -0.098  -0.116 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.037)
 -0.122  -0.122  -0.125 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020)
N 3607422 3607422 3607422 3607360 2414237
Price Per SqFt, New Homes 105.763 107.718 105.763 105.763 105.897
Price Per SqFt, Old Homes 77.373 80.886 77.373 77.373 81.333
Panel B: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Single-Family Properties
 -0.071  -0.063 
(0.013) (0.013)
 0.011
(0.007)
 -0.043  -0.042  -0.043 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
 -0.089  -0.087  -0.091 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.023)
 -0.109  -0.106  -0.093 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
N 15068454 15068454 15068454 15068365 9165003
Price Per SqFt, New Homes 108.628 109.845 108.628 108.628 111.593
Price Per SqFt, Old Homes 102.204 111.003 102.204 102.204 104.132
Controls X
Property FE (Repeat Sales) X
 Log Price per Square Foot
0-10 Years After Mandate
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
2-6 Years Before Mandate
7-10 Years After Mandate
7-10 Years After Mandate
0-10 Years After Mandate
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
2-6 Years Before Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on DataQuick samples (1988-2012) of multi- (Panel A) and single-family
(Panel B) houses. Observations are weighted by 1980 population in tract. The outcome variable is the logarithm of the
price per sqft. Tract-year, tract-vintage and vintage-year FEs are included. Column 4 controls for average room size
and FEs for building condition, number of units, stories, and rooms in the building; Column 5 includes house FEs. For
implementing states, the sample includes a [−6,10] window around the introduction of the mandates. Average price
per sqft of new and old houses in implementing states before the mandates is shown. Standard errors clustered at the
state level (42 clusters) are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Price Effects, by Share of Children in Tract
(1) (2)
 -0.057  -0.040 
(0.011) (0.008)
 -0.017 
(0.011)
 -0.030 
(0.009)
 -0.032 
(0.010)
 -0.038 
(0.020)
N 20537824 20537824
Mandate Effects on Old Houses, 
High Share of Children
Mandate Effects on Old Houses, 
IV Quartile Share of Children
Mandate Effects on Old Houses, 
II Quartile Share of Children
Mandate Effects on Old Houses, 
III Quartile Share of Children
Dependent Variable: Log Price per Square Foot
Mandate Effects on Old Houses
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the transaction sample from DataQuick for the years 1988-2012, where each
observation is weighted by tract population in 1980. Quantiles in share of children in the population are determined at
the tract level. The outcome variable is the logarithm of the transaction price divided by square footage of the house.
Tract-year, tract-vintage and vintage-year fixed effects are included. For implementing states, the sample is limited to a
[−6,10] window around the introduction of the mandates. Average price per square foot in implementing states before
the mandates is shown separately for new and old houses at the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered at
the state level are shown in parentheses.
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Table 4: Price Effects By Buyer’s Origin
No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mandate Effects on Old Houses:
 0.004  0.007  0.000  0.010  0.002
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
 -0.008  0.013  -0.020  0.027  -0.019 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.022) (0.010)
 -0.020  -0.013  -0.021  0.008  -0.020 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
N 2837279 2008521 654338 1422723 1236834
118.062 104.722 125.033 104.831 122.848
98.857 96.539 101.328 96.836 100.571
4-6 Years After 
Mandate
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
Price Per SqFt, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Price Per SqFt, Old 
Homes, Pre-Period
Log Price per Square Foot
Full 
Sample
Dependent Variable:
Buyer from Treated State Buyer from High Lead Division
0-3 Years After 
Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the transaction sample from DataQuick for the years 1988-2012, where
each observation is weighted by tract population in 1980. The sample is limited to transactions for which the buyer
could be linked to another transaction in which they were the seller. The outcome variable is the logarithm of the
transaction price divided by square footage of the house. For implementing states, the sample is limited to a [-6,10]
window around the introduction of the mandates. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample according to whether the buyer
sold a house in a treated state within 3 year of the transaction. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample according to whether
the buyer sold a house in the Northeast, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, or South Atlantic within 3 year of the
transaction. Tract-year, tract-vintage and vintage-year fixed effects are included. Average price per square foot in
implementing states before the mandates is shown separately for new and old houses in each subsample at the bottom
of each column. Standard errors clustered at the state level (42 clusters) ares shown in parentheses.
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Table 5: Allocation Effects
Dependent Variable:
HH has 
child <6
HH has child 
<6, Poor
HH has 
child 6-11
HH has child 
6-11, Poor
Youngest HH 
member >59
Youngest HH 
member >59, 
Poor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Single Post-Period
 -0.017  -0.012  -0.023  -0.011  0.026  0.023
(0.008) (0.006) (0.017) (0.005) (0.019) (0.011)
Panel B: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Multiple Post-Periods
 -0.036  -0.021  0.001  0.000  0.009  0.019
(0.011) (0.007) (0.018) (0.004) (0.019) (0.012)
 -0.020  -0.010  -0.036  -0.022  0.028  0.013
(0.012) (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.019) (0.013)
 0.009  0.003  -0.038  -0.013  0.011  0.026
(0.016) (0.013) (0.022) (0.006) (0.026) (0.016)
 0.004  -0.009  -0.039  -0.012  0.080  0.046
(0.014) (0.010) (0.030) (0.009) (0.023) (0.011)
N 211994 211994 211994 211994 211994 211994
0.162 0.028 0.155 0.022 0.199 0.077
0.150 0.051 0.153 0.049 0.266 0.110Outcome Mean, Old 
Homes, Pre-Period
Mandate Effects on 
Old Houses
0-3 Years After 
Mandate
4-6 Years After 
Mandate
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
10+ Years After 
Mandate
Outcome Mean, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the AHS sample for the years 1985-2011. Outcome variables are defined in each column. State-year, year-vintage,
month of interview and unit fixed effects are included. Mean outcome values in implementing states before the mandates are shown separately for new and old
houses at the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered at the state level (36 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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Table 6: Price Effects, by Elasticity of Housing Supply
HH has 
child <6
Youngest HH 
member >59
HH has 
child <6
Youngest HH 
member >59
Housing Type:
Multi-
Family
Single-
Family All All
Multi-
Family
Single-
Family All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 -0.121  -0.099  -0.009  0.031  -0.094  -0.078  -0.236  -0.024 
(0.039) (0.031) (0.015) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.058) (0.099)
 0.109  0.061  -0.026  -0.034 
(0.039) (0.030) (0.021) (0.030)
 0.040  0.012  0.222  0.051
(0.008) (0.007) (0.064) (0.094)
N 2999405 12936106 180494 180494 3607402 15068442 208483 208483
103.975 107.091 0.162 0.194 105.763 108.628 0.162 0.199
85.293 100.774 0.151 0.266 77.374 102.204 0.150 0.266
Population Growth
Log Price per Square 
Foot
Mean Outcome, New Homes, 
Pre-Period
Mean Outcome, Old Homes, Pre-
Period
Market Characteristic: Housing Supply Elasticity
Mandate Effects on Old Houses
Mandate Effects on Old Houses 
X High Elasticity
Mandate Effects on Old Houses 
X Population Growth
Log Price per Square 
Foot
Dependent Variable:
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the transaction sample from DataQuick (1988-2012) and allocation data from AHS (1985-2011) linked with housing
supply elasticity data from Saiz (2010) and population growth data from the Census. Each observation in the DataQuick sample is weighted by tract population in
1980. The outcome variables are indicated in the second row. Columns 1,2,5,6 include tract-year, tract-vintage, and vintage-year fixed effects interacted with a high
elasticity or positive population growth indicator; Columns 3,4,7,8 include state-year, year-vintage, month of interview, and unit fixed effects interacted with a high
elasticity or positive population growth indicator. For implementing states, Columns 1,2,5,6 limit the sample to a [−6,10] window around the introduction of the
mandates. Mean outcome values in implementing states before the mandates are shown separately for new and old houses at the bottom of each column. Standard
errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
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Table 7: Rent Effects by Number of Bedrooms and Children’s Presence at Baseline
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 -0.036  -0.041  -0.005  -0.033 
(0.047) (0.025) (0.033) (0.026)
 0.043  -0.022  0.001  -0.012  0.017  0.064
(0.061) (0.039) (0.036) (0.063) (0.039) (0.040)
 0.012  0.007  -0.021 
(0.055) (0.032) (0.032)
 -0.023  0.080  0.066  0.039
(0.044) (0.037) (0.033) (0.021)
 0.005  0.063  0.117
(0.058) (0.238) (0.246)
 0.066  -0.027  -0.082  0.031
(0.049) (0.243) (0.249) (0.022)
N 81170 83430 83430 83028 63658 65761 65761 65431
Log Rent, Not Family-Friendly 5.791 5.750 5.750 5.750 5.744 5.705 5.705 5.704
Log Rent, Family-Friendly 5.941 5.901 5.901 5.901 5.902 5.861 5.861 5.861
Old family-friendly = Old not 
family-friendly (p-value) 0.785 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.155 0.117
Old family friendly = New 
family friendly (p-value) 0.474 0.089 0.093 0.397 0.968 0.947
StateXVintage FE X X
YearXVintage FE X X X X X X
StateXYear FE X X
StateXYearXVintage FE X X
Family-FriendlyXYear FE X X X X
Property FE X X X X X X
Post Mandate, Child at Baseline
Post Mandate, Child at 
Baseline, Old House
 Log Monthly Rent
Post Mandate
Post Mandate, Old House
Post Mandate, 2+ Bedrooms
Post Mandate, 2+ Bedrooms, 
Old House
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the AHS sample (1985-2011). Each column includes month of interview FEs. Columns 1 and 5 include a second order
polynomial in square footage and FEs for state-number of bedrooms, year-number of bedrooms, number of units, and condominium. Mean outcome values in
implementing states before the mandates are shown at the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered at the state level (36 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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A The first stage on inspections and abatement
I collected data on lead inspectors and certified contractors, as well as on inspections and abatement
projects, from selected states. The data are sparse and usually start after the introduction of the
mandates, as the states set up registries in compliance with the regulations. Moreover, in general,
voluntary inspections are not included. Finally, many of the inspectors’ and contractors’ licenses
are dormant, as renewal costs are low compared to the initial fixed cost of obtaining a new license.
Here, I compare an early adopting state, Massachusetts, which introduced the lead mandate in
1971, with Ohio, which introduced it in 2004. Figure A.1 shows that, to this day, Massachusetts
performs only 700 inspections per month, despite the fact that Massachusetts contains over 2.1
million houses built before 1978. Two thirds of these inspections visit a house for the first time.
These figures have decreased over time, but remarkably, over the majority of first inspections find
some lead hazard violations. In line with the trend in inspections, the number of certified lead
contractors has also decreased over time. Nonetheless, licensed contractors seem to respond more
to the funds available for training than to the changes in the housing stock, as emphasized by
the spike starting in 2010, when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009
increased local governments’ ability to organize training workshops.
A similar pattern is visible in Ohio, as shown in Figure A.4: after an initial spike in the num-
ber of licensed inspectors in 2006, their number goes back to the pre-mandate level, fluctuating
between 700 and 800 active licenses per year. In Ohio, the number of licensed contractors does
not respond to regulation, and it increases markedly in 2009, similarly to what happens in Mas-
sachusetts (Figure A.1). Data on abatement projects in Ohio shows that there have been an average
of over 1,000 projects in the fiscal years 2009-2013.
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Figure A.1: Enforcement, MA
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Source: Inspections data from Massachusetts Department of Public Health; lead-licensed contractors from Mas-
sachusetts Department of Labor Standards. The figure plots the number of inspections (black dashed), first inspections
to a house (green dotted) and first inspections that find violations (red solid) on the left axis, and the number of
contractors that are licensed for lead projects (blue dash-dot) on the right axis over calendar time in years.
Figure A.2: Houses with Identified Lead Hazards and Abated Houses, MA
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Source: Massachusetts Department of Public Health. The figure plots the number of houses with identified lead
hazards (green bar) in Massachusetts for the years 1995-2015. A lead hazard can be identified either by an inspection
outcome recording a violation or by an elevated blood lead level. The red bar illustrates how many of these houses are
eventually abated.
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Figure A.3: Houses with Identified Lead Hazards and Repeat Offender Houses
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Sources: Massachusetts Department of Public Health (1995-2015), Maryland Department of the Environment (1995-
2015), New Jersey Department of Health (1973-2015), North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services
(1993-2015). The figure plots the number of houses with identified lead hazards (green bar) in Massachusetts, Mary-
land, New Jersey, and North Carolina. A lead hazard can be identified either by an inspection outcome recording a
violation or by an elevated blood lead level. The red bar illustrates how many of these houses present a new lead
hazard after the first one.
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Figure A.4: Enforcement, OH
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Source: Ohio Department of Health. The figure plots the number of contractors that are licensed for lead projects
(blue solid) on the left axis and the number of lead inspectors on the right axis (green dashed) over calendar time in
years. The vertical line indicates the year Ohio introduced a lead abatement mandate, 2003.
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B Data Appendix
From the transaction file, I drop properties with missing characteristics and transactions that are not
arms-length transfers, such as transactions between family members, to ensure that the sale price
reflects the true value of the house.32 When, according to the assessor file, properties undergo
major renovations, I replace construction year with the renovation year because these renovations
likely change the lead status of the house and because the renovations are public information
available to the buyers. Indeed, in these cases, the assessor deems the original construction year
not informative of the value of the house. My results are robust to both dropping these properties
and including them with their original vintage. Then, I assign each geocoded property to a census
tract according to 2010 boundaries, dropping observations in areas that were not tracted in 1980.
To avoid comparing houses in neighborhoods that are fundamentally different in terms of age
of the housing stock, I drop all tracts with only new or only old houses. This leaves over 27
million transactions for 22 million properties in 44,170 census tracts. Furthermore, in my preferred
specification, I limit the sample for implementing states to observations in a window of [−6,10]
years around the introduction of the policies to obtain a more balanced panel. Columns 1-2 in
Appendix Table C.5 show that neither this sample restriction nor the unbalanced nature of the full
panel affect the results.
In the empirical analysis I estimate the effect of the mandates on house values separately for
single- and multi-family homes. I include condominiums among the multi-family houses, as con-
dominium conversion is as much an endogenous choice as tenancy is. Moreover, in my sample,
57 percent of multi-family properties and 40 percent of condominiums are rented, while only 21
percent of single-family properties are rented.
Table B.1 displays the characteristics of the housing stock in my two housing datasets: the
DataQuick data repository and the AHS, as well as selected demographic characteristics from the
32Specifically, I drop duplicate transactions, transactions for less than $10,000, not arms-length transfer, group-
property sales, subdivisions and property splits, transactions that include liens or encumbrances or only partial interest
in the property, and repeat sales. Moreover, I drop properties where any of the following characteristics is missing:
address, square footage, year of construction.
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AHS. Although the DataQuick and AHS samples are similar in terms of the size of the housing
units, as well as house values and age of the housing stock, houses in the DataQuick sample are
somewhat newer, and their average price per square foot is higher, likely reflecting selection in
terms of what houses are transacted.
Figure B.1: Transaction Data Coverage
No Data
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
2010-2012
The figure shows a heat map of the coverage of the DataQuick data repository, by county and initial coverage year.
Darker shades indicate counties that have been in the database the longest.
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics
AHS
Multi-Family Single-Family
(1) (2) (3)
167.85 140.02 122.88
(610.73) (922.60) (263.71)
1973.15 1967.90 1953.89
(22.61) (24.53) (22.62)
1475.78 1695.60 1631.30
(893.75) (721.78) (1299.59)
2.34 3.67 5.40
(4.08) (5.10) (1.89)
0.15
(0.36)
0.15
(0.36)
0.40
(0.49)
629.96
(440.89)
3607422 15068454 211994Observations
Price per Square Foot 
(Assessed Value in AHS)
DataQuick
Monthly Rent
Vintage
Square Footage
Number of Rooms
HH has Child <6
HH has Child 6-11
House is Rented
Notes: The table reports summary statistics from the DataQuick sample (years 1988-2012) by multi- and single family,
and the AHS sample (years 1985-2011). In the AHS sample, the price variable is the assessed value of home-owned
houses and vintage is a 10-year bin starting in 1900 (AHS). Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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C Additional Figures and Tables
Figure C.1: State-level Trends in Covariates
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Notes: Construction Permits data were retrieved from the Census Bureau, Building Permits Survey; Population data
are provided by the National Cancer Institute, SEER Program; State GDP data were retrieved from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. The figures plot DD coefficients on year-by-year mandate dummies and reports coefficient and
standard error for a single post-mandate indicator in the top-right box. Outcome variables are indicated in each plot.
The vertical line indicates the introduction of the mandate. For implementing states, the sample is limited to a [-6,10]
window around the introduction of the mandates. State, year, and trends for treated states are included. T-1 is the
omitted category. The vertical bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure C.2: Share of Houses Built, by Heating Fuel
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The figure plots the share of houses heated by gas (blue dots) and oil (red triangles) built between the year 1900 and
the year 2000 in the DataQuick sample.
Figure C.3: Price Effects, Balanced Panel
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Notes: The figure plots DD estimates on the transaction sample for multi- (left panel) and single-family buildings (right
panel) from DataQuick for the years 1988-2012, where each observation is weighted by tract population in 1980. The
outcome variable is the logarithm of the transaction price divided by square footage of the house. The sample is limited
to a [−6,10] window around introduction of the mandate in treated states. Only treated states covered from one year
prior to seven years after the mandates and nontreated states covered since 1988 are included. Tract-year, tract-vintage
and vintage-year fixed effects are included. Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. The
vertical line at t = 0 indicates the introduction of the mandate in each state.
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Figure C.4: Price Effects, Placebo Specification in Nontreated States
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Notes: The figure plots DD estimates on the transaction sample for multi-family buildings in nontreated states from
DataQuick for the years 1988-2012, where each observation is weighted by tract population in 1980. The outcome
variable is the logarithm of the transaction price divided by square footage of the house. Tract-year, tract-vintage
and vintage-year fixed effects are included. Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. The
vertical line at t = 0 indicates the introduction of the placebo mandate in each state. Placebo mandates are randomly
assigned to nontreated states. Each placebo mandate is introduced in a year when an actual mandate is introduced in a
treated state.
Figure C.5: Price Effects, Dropping 2008-onward
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Notes: The figure plots DD coefficients on year-by-year mandate dummies, estimated on the DataQuick samples
(1988-2007) of multi- (left panel) and single-family (right panel) houses. Each census tract is weighted by 1980 pop-
ulation. The outcome variable is the logarithm of the price per square foot. The vertical line indicates the introduction
of the mandate. For implementing states, the sample is limited to a [-6,10] window around the introduction of the man-
dates. Tract-year, tract-vintage and vintage-year fixed effects are included. T-1 is the omitted category. The vertical
bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level (42 clusters).
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Table C.1: Sale Effects
Dependent Variable:
Sample: Multi-Family Single-Family
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mandate Effects on Old Houses:
 -0.984  -0.502  -0.209  0.041
(0.512) (0.447) (0.313) (0.296)
 -1.385  -0.194 
(0.518) (0.368)
 -1.315  -0.623 
(0.507) (0.499)
 0.028  -0.887 
(0.660) (0.697)
N 552414 552414 1945369 1945369 552414 1945369
7.165 7.165 11.043 11.043 4.366 6.071
6.683 6.683 11.635 11.635 3.438 6.575
Number of SalesProbability of Sale (X 1,000)
Post-Mandate
Outcome Mean, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Outcome Mean, Old 
Homes, Pre-Period
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
Multi-Family Single-Family
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the transaction sample of multi- (Columns 1-2, 5) and single-family properties (Column 3-4, 6) from DataQuick for the
years 1988-2012, where each observation is weighted by tract population in 1980. Each observation is a tract-year-vintage cell, and the dependent variable is the
share of houses in the cell transacted in that year multiplied by 1,000 (Columns 1-4) or the Number of Transactions (Columns 5-6). Tract-year, tract-vintage and
vintage-year fixed effects arse included. For implementing states, the sample is limited to a [-6,10] window around the introduction of the mandates. The mean of
the outcome variable implementing states before the mandates is shown separetely for new and old houses at the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered
at the state level (42 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.2: Sales Compositon Effects
Number 
of Rooms
Room 
Size
Square 
Footage Renovations Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Multi-Family Properties
 -0.001  -0.564  13.530  0.000  0.045
(0.014) (2.769) (13.506) (0.005) (0.022)
 0.055  2.720  12.006  0.009  -0.058 
(0.035) (3.150) (31.184) (0.007) (0.054)
 0.040  -1.436  7.867  0.006  0.057
(0.024) (2.998) (35.718) (0.006) (0.046)
N 1224194 1478477 1478477 1478477 1478466
Mean Outcome, New Homes 5.202 274.871 1482.027 0.089 2.662
Mean Outcome, Old Homes 4.962 237.626 1837.011 0.206 2.792
Panel B: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Single-Family Properties
 0.018  -54.179  -414.467  0.001  0.003
(0.013) (60.159) (441.190) (0.003) (0.006)
 0.018  78.028  377.899  -0.001  -0.040 
(0.009) (97.383) (483.808) (0.003) (0.029)
 0.027  21.688  66.650  -0.005  0.011
(0.010) (79.799) (378.062) (0.004) (0.030)
N 7867030 8329855 8329855 8329855 8329839
Mean Outcome, New Homes 7.045 291.322 2067.409 0.150 2.654
Mean Outcome, Old Homes 6.049 241.588 1492.137 0.346 2.513
7-10 Years After Mandate
7-10 Years After Mandate
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
Dependent Variable:
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the transaction sample of multi- (Panel A) and single-family properties
(Panel B) from DataQuick for the years 1988-2012, where each observation is weighted by tract population in 1980.
The dependent variable is indicated in each column. Tract-year, tract-vintage and vintage-year fixed effects arse
included. For implementing states, the sample is limited to a [-6,10] window around the introduction of the mandates.
The mean of the dependent variable in implementing states before the mandates is shown separetely for new and old
houses at the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered at the state level (42 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.3: Price Effects, by Occupancy
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 -0.099  -0.054 
(0.016) (0.010)
 -0.056  -0.026 
(0.014) (0.011)
 -0.117  -0.074 
(0.019) (0.015)
 -0.147  -0.089 
(0.020) (0.012)
N 5575504 5575504 14628577 14628577
Price Per SqFt, New Homes 106.037 106.037 108.901 108.901
Price Per SqFt, Old Homes 90.337 90.337 100.990 100.990
7-10 Years After Mandate
Rental Properties Owner-Occupied Properties
 Log Price per Square Foot
0-10 Years After Mandate
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the transaction sample of rental (Columns 1-2) and owner-occupied houses (Columns 3-4) from DataQuick for the
years 1988-2012, where each observation is weighted by tract population in 1980. The outcome variable is the logarithm of the transaction price divided by square
footage of the house. Tract-year, tract-vintage and vintage-year fixed effects are included. For implementing states, the sample is limited to a [−6,10] window
around the introduction of the mandates. Average price per square foot in implementing states before the mandates is shown separately for new and old houses at
the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered at the state level (42 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.4: Price Effects, 5- and 10-Year Windows around Mandates
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mandate Effects on Old Houses:
 0.008  -0.006  -0.015  -0.020 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005)
 -0.024  -0.017  -0.061  -0.042 
(0.017) (0.006) (0.021) (0.012)
 -0.025  -0.015  -0.081  -0.055 
(0.013) (0.005) (0.015) (0.011)
N 4205906 4174389 7689644 7689644
98.16 98.15 108.98 108.98
114.70 115.06 112.26 112.26
State-Year X X
Tract-Year X X
Vintage-Year X X X X
State-Vintage X X
Tract-Vintage X X
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
Price Per SqFt, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Price Per SqFt, Old 
Homes, Pre-Period
 Log Price per Square Foot
1973-1983 Vintages Only 1968-1988 Vintages Only
0-3 Years After 
Mandate
4-6 Years After 
Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the transaction sample from DataQuick for the years 1988-2012, where each observation is weighted by tract population
in 1980. The sample is limited to houses built between 1973 and 1983 in Columns 1-2 and between 1968 and 1988 in Columns 3-4. The outcome variable is the
logarithm of the transaction price divided by square footage of the house. Tract-year, tract-vintage and vintage-year fixed effects are included, where vintage is
construction year. For implementing states, the sample is limited to a [-6,10] window around the introduction of the mandates. Average price per square foot in
implementing states before the mandates is shown separately for new and old houses at the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered at the state level (42
clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.5: Price Effects for Multi-Family Houses, Alternative Specifications
Log Price
Full 
Sample
Balanced 
Panel
Implementing 
States Only
No 
Weights
AHS 
States
Main 
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Mandate Effects, Multi-Family Properties
 -0.032  -0.021  -0.037  -0.027  -0.024  -0.025 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
 -0.101  -0.104  -0.059  -0.103  -0.097  -0.109 
(0.023) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.022)
 -0.117  -0.124  -0.052  -0.118  -0.126  -0.126 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.037) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019)
 -0.116 
(0.020)
N 3961195 3552256 204525 3669173 3583352 3607422
103.866 105.763 105.763 105.747 105.763 105.763
74.213 77.380 77.373 77.366 77.380 77.373
Panel B: Mandate Effects, Single-Family Properties
 -0.043  -0.041  -0.019  -0.046  -0.042  -0.047 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
 -0.088  -0.089  -0.009  -0.089  -0.093  -0.094 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017)
 -0.101  -0.114  0.005  -0.104  -0.107  -0.114 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
 -0.103 
(0.020)
N 17047218 14698354 1512625 15980520 14773465 15068454
107.922 108.628 108.628 108.458 109.898 108.628
101.172 102.204 102.204 102.134 102.466 102.204
11+ Years After 
Mandate
Price Per SqFt, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Price Per SqFt, Old 
Homes, Pre-Period
0-3 Years After 
Mandate
4-6 Years After 
Mandate
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
11+ Years After 
Mandate
Price Per SqFt, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Price Per SqFt, Old 
Homes, Pre-Period
Dependent Variable: Log Price per Square Foot
0-3 Years After 
Mandate
4-6 Years After 
Mandate
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on DataQuick samples (1988-2012) of multi- (Panel A) and single-family
(Panel B) houses. Observations are weighted by 1980 population in tract. The outcome variable is log of price per
sqft, but for Column 6 which uses log price as outcome and controls for a quadratic in square footage. Tract-year, tract-
vintage and vintage-year FEs are included. For implementing states, the sample includes a [−6,10]window around the
introduction of the mandates, but for Column 1, which includes the full sample. Column 2 presents estimates from a
balanced sample that includes all non-implementing states and only those implementing states with observations both
before and after the mandate (CT, GA, MI, NC, OH, RI). Column 3 limits the sample to implementing states only (CT,
GA, IL, MD, MI, MN, MO, NH, NC, OH, RI, VT). Column 4 removes the 1980 tract population weights. Column
5 limits the sample to states included also in the AHS sample (AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, HI, IL, IN, IA, MD, MI,
NV, NM, NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WI). Each column shows average price per sqft of new
and old houses in implementing states before the mandates. Standard errors clustered at state level (42 clusters) are in
parentheses, but for Column 3 which clusters SEs at state-vintage level.
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Table C.6: Price Effects, Assessed Value in AHS Sample
Baseline
State-
Vintage 
Trends
Property 
FE
DQ
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mandate Effects on Old Houses:
 -0.004  -0.036  0.013  -0.027 
(0.028) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018)
 -0.017  -0.062  -0.034  -0.039 
(0.030) (0.041) (0.026) (0.036)
 -0.028  -0.079  -0.056  -0.073 
(0.043) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
 -0.027  -0.054  -0.047 
(0.035) (0.063) (0.047)
N 115919 115919 114722 89004
73.375 73.375 73.397 88.934
54.056 54.056 53.818 67.967
State-Year FE X X X X
State-Vintage FE X X X X
Year-Vintage FE X X X X
State-Vintage Trends X X X
Property FE X
11+ Years After 
Mandate
Value Per SqFt, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Value Per SqFt, Old 
Homes, Pre-Period
Dependent Variable: Log Assessed Value per Square Foot
0-3 Years After 
Mandate
4-6 Years After 
Mandate
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the AHS sample for the years 1985-2011. The outcome variable is the
logarithm of the unit assessed value divided by square footage of the unit. The set of fixed effects included in each
specification is defined in each column. Average value per square foot in implementing states before the mandates is
shown separately for new and old houses at the bottom of each column for each estimation sample. Standard errors
clustered at state level (36 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.7: Price Effects by Year of Construction
Dependent Variable:
1800-1949 1950-1977 1990s
(1) (2) (3)
Mandate Effects on Old Houses:
 -0.009  -0.019  0.016
(0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
 -0.080  -0.044  0.040
(0.026) (0.007) (0.021)
 -0.074  -0.050  0.057
(0.029) (0.011) (0.017)
N
88.40 104.93 108.19
Price Per SqFt, 1980s 
Houses, Pre-Period
Price Per SqFt, 
Relevant Vintage, 
108.37
0-3 Years After 
Mandate
4-6 Years After 
Mandate
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
18,891,208
 Log Price per Square Foot
Notes: The table presents DD estimates from a single regression on the transaction sample from DataQuick for the
years 1988-2012, where each observation is weighted by tract population in 1980. The oldest (1700s) and most recent
(2000s) vintages are dropped from the sample since there are too few observations in these categories. The table
presents DD coefficients on period-by-period indicators for homes built 1800-1949, 1950-1977, and in the 1990s
relative to homes built 1978-1989. Tract-year, tract-vintage and old-year fixed effects are included. For implementing
states, the sample is limited to a [-6,10] window around the introduction of the mandates. Average price per square
foot in implementing states before the mandates is shown separately for each vintage at the bottom of each column.
Standard errors clustered at the state level (38 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.8: Price Effects, by State
Dependent Variable:
Dropped State: Connecticut Michigan Ohio Rhode Island
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Mandate Effects, Multi-Family Properties
-0.043 -0.021 0.040 0.085
(0.025) (0.019) (0.013) (0.022)
-0.070 -0.257 -0.042 0.086
(0.032) (0.040) (0.023) (0.026)
-0.027 -0.283 -0.122 -0.072
(0.029) (0.041) (0.028) (0.028)
N 50287 17798 47359 32093
123.533 137.862 87.803 84.755
Price Per SqFt, Old Homes 90.762 143.595 61.515 51.260
Panel B: Mandate Effects, Single-Family Properties
-0.016 -0.050 0.024 0.053
(0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.009)
-0.030 -0.214 -0.054 0.048
(0.008) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011)
-0.023 -0.251 -0.125 -0.022
(0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.016)
N 198666 200085 518416 80713
116.989 144.838 92.059 111.062
Price Per SqFt, Old Homes 116.518 141.739 82.981 93.941
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
7-10 Years After Mandate
Price Per SqFt, New Homes
 Log Price per Square Foot
0-3 Years After Mandate
Price Per SqFt, New Homes
4-6 Years After Mandate
7-10 Years After Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on DataQuick samples (1988-2012) of multi- (Panel A) and single-family
(Panel B) houses. Observations are weighted by 1980 population in tract. The outcome variable is the logarithm of
the price per square foot. Each column is estimated on the state indicated at the top, limiting the sample to a [−5,7]
window around the introduction of the mandate in that state, if available. Each regression includes tract-year and
tract-vintage fixed effects. Average price per square foot in each state before the mandate is shown separately for new
and old houses at the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.9: Price Effects for Multi-Family Houses, Alternative Sets of Fixed Effects
State-Year & 
State-Vintage 
FE
County-Year & 
County-Vintage 
FE
Tract-Year & 
State-Vintage 
FE
State-Year FE, 
State-Vintage 
Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Mandate Effects, Multi-Family Properties
 -0.055  -0.056  -0.025  -0.020 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.017) (0.052)
 -0.209  -0.189  -0.094  -0.140 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.034) (0.086)
 -0.187  -0.165  -0.115  -0.134 
(0.035) (0.025) (0.023) (0.078)
N 3646188 3645874 3621778 3607422
105.763 105.763 105.763 105.763
77.373 77.373 77.373 77.373
Panel B: Mandate Effects, Single-Family Properties
 -0.078  -0.069  -0.048  0.018
(0.028) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017)
 -0.181  -0.146  -0.089  -0.009 
(0.054) (0.031) (0.020) (0.040)
 -0.248  -0.174  -0.116  -0.026 
(0.050) (0.028) (0.018) (0.034)
N 15086525 15086374 15082650 15068454
108.628 108.628 108.628 108.628
102.204 102.204 102.204 102.204
State-Vintage FE X X X
County-Vintage FE X
State-Vintage Trends X
Price Per SqFt, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Price Per SqFt, Old Homes, 
Pre-Period
Dependent Variable: Log Price per Square Foot
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
7-10 Years After Mandate
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
7-10 Years After Mandate
Price Per SqFt, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Price Per SqFt, Old Homes, 
Pre-Period
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on on DataQuick samples (1988-2012) of multi- (Panel A) and single-family
(Panel B) houses. Observations are weighted by 1980 population in tract. The outcome variable is the logarithm of
the transaction price divided by square footage of the house. The set of fixed effects included in each specification is
defined in each column. Average price per square foot in implementing states before the mandates is shown separately
for new and old houses at the bottom of each column for each estimation sample. Standard errors clustered at state
level (42 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.10: Allocation Summary Statistics
Before Mandate After Mandate Before Mandate After Mandate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.17 0.15 0.15 0.13
(0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.34)
0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14
(0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35)
0.22 0.23 0.28 0.29
(0.42) (0.42) (0.45) (0.45)
10.60 10.75 10.30 10.46
(1.02) (1.14) (1.09) (1.15)
0.56 0.65 0.45 0.53
(0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
0.10 0.16 0.14 0.17
(0.31) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37)
Observations 33765 7879 133779 36571
Log Income
College Educated
Black HH Head
New Houses
Child <6
Old Houses
Child 6-11
Household >59
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of characteristics of households living in old and new houses before and after a mandate, from the AHS sample (years
1985-2011). Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.11: Effects on Probability of Moving
Dependent Variable:
Sample: Multi-Family Single-Family
(1) (4)
Panel A: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Single Post-Period
 0.013  -0.004 
(0.018) (0.019)
Panel B: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Multiple Post-Periods
 0.057  0.000
(0.015) (0.027)
 -0.065  0.001
(0.034) (0.018)
 0.014  -0.015 
(0.028) (0.032)
 0.041  -0.016 
(0.019) (0.028)
N 48826 104390
Outcome Mean, New Homes 0.387 0.139
Outcome Mean, Old Homes, Pre-Period 0.340 0.118
10+ Years After Mandate
Change in Residents
Mandate Effects on Old Houses
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
7-10 Years After Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the AHS sample of multi- (Column 1) and single-family houses (Column
2) for the years 1985-2011. The outcome variable is an indicator for changes in residents in a given house. State-year,
year-vintage, month of interview and house fixed effects are included. Mean outcome values in implementing states
before the mandates are shown separately for new and old houses at the bottom of each column. Standard errors
clustered at the state level (36 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
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Table C.12: Allocation Effects, Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable:
HH has child 
<6
HH has child 
<6
Youngest HH 
member >59
Youngest HH 
member >59
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Single Post-Period
 -0.020  -0.045  0.030  -0.044 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.020)
Panel B: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Multiple Post-Periods
 -0.036  -0.052  0.013  -0.036 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.018)
 -0.028  -0.044  0.026  -0.036 
(0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.020)
 0.005  -0.025  0.019  -0.064 
(0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.029)
 0.002  -0.054  0.088  -0.013 
(0.015) (0.028) (0.018) (0.036)
N 211994 211994 211994 211994
Outcome Mean, New Homes, 
Pre-Period 0.162 0.162 0.199 0.199
Outcome Mean, Old Homes, 
Pre-Period 0.150 0.150 0.266 0.266
State-Year X X X X
Vintage-Year X X X X
State-Vintage X X
Property X X
State-Vintage-Specific Trends X X
Mandate Effects on Old 
Houses
0-3 Years After Mandate
4-6 Years After Mandate
7-10 Years After Mandate
10+ Years After Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the AHS sample for the years 1985-2011. The outcome variables are defined in each column. State-year, year-
vintage, state-vintage and month of interview fixed effects are included in Columns 1 and 3; state-year, year-vintage, month of interview, house fixed effects and
state-vintage-specific linear trends are included in Columns 2 and 4. Standard errors clustered at the state level (36 clusters) are shown in parentheses.
59
ForO
nline
Publication
Table C.13: Allocation Effects by Housing Structure
Sample:
Dependent Variable:
HH has child 
<6
HH has child 
6-11
Youngest HH 
member >59
HH has child 
<6
HH has child 
6-11
Youngest HH 
member >59
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Single Post-Period
 -0.052  -0.041  -0.029  -0.021  -0.023  0.042
(0.032) (0.022) (0.045) (0.017) (0.027) (0.017)
Panel B: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Multiple Post-Periods
 -0.084  -0.006  -0.042  -0.035  0.010  0.030
(0.022) (0.013) (0.042) (0.019) (0.024) (0.016)
 -0.049  -0.087  -0.008  -0.021  -0.042  0.028
(0.045) (0.033) (0.064) (0.029) (0.028) (0.011)
 -0.015  -0.062  -0.051  -0.011  -0.033  0.040
(0.036) (0.027) (0.076) (0.031) (0.039) (0.024)
 -0.032  -0.025  -0.012  0.006  -0.057  0.105
(0.039) (0.029) (0.036) (0.028) (0.055) (0.027)
N 53581 53581 53581 114990 114990 114990
0.059 0.037 0.376 0.214 0.233 0.124
0.130 0.107 0.314 0.154 0.172 0.247
10+ Years After 
Mandate
Outcome Mean, New 
Homes, Pre-Period
Outcome Mean, Old 
Homes, Pre-Period
Multi-Family Single-Family
Mandate Effects on 
Old Houses
0-3 Years After 
Mandate
4-6 Years After 
Mandate
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the AHS sample of multi- (Columns 1-3) and single-family houses (Columns 4-6) for the years 1985-2011. Outcome
variables are defined in each column. State-year, year-vintage, month of interview and unit fixed effects are included. Mean outcome values in implementing states
before the mandates are shown separately for new and old houses at the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered at the state level (36 clusters) are shown
in parentheses.
60
ForO
nline
Publication
Table C.14: Rental Market Effects, Extensive and Intensive Margins
Sample:
Dependent Variable:
Entry into 
Rental
Exit from 
Rental
Log Monthly 
Rent
Entry into 
Rental
Exit from 
Rental
Log Monthly 
Rent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Single Post-Period
 0.144  0.013  0.022  -0.011  0.074  0.260
(0.092) (0.010) (0.039) (0.011) (0.053) (0.031)
Panel B: Mandate Effects on Old Houses, Multiple Post-Periods
 0.113  0.014  0.039  -0.007  0.033  0.359
(0.078) (0.016) (0.032) (0.008) (0.039) (0.072)
 0.170  0.019  0.111  -0.013  0.097  0.227
(0.093) (0.011) (0.081) (0.015) (0.088) (0.040)
 0.222  0.015  -0.131  -0.015  0.080  0.088
(0.121) (0.007) (0.091) (0.011) (0.113) (0.125)
 0.110  -0.003  0.011  -0.013  0.092  0.250
(0.108) (0.009) (0.078) (0.014) (0.089) (0.073)
N 4244 31533 44860 83480 8808 12551
0.110 0.017 6.150 0.011 0.110 6.108
0.069 0.013 5.785 0.020 0.155 5.830
Outcome Mean, 
New Homes
Outcome Mean, Old 
Homes, Pre-Period
Multi-Family Single-Family
0-3 Years After 
Mandate
4-6 Years After 
Mandate
7-10 Years After 
Mandate
10+ Years After 
Mandate
Mandate Effects on 
Old Houses
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the AHS sample of multi- (Columns 1-3) and single-family houses (Columns 4-6) for the years 1985-2011. Outcome
variables are defined in each column. State-year, year-vintage, month of interview and house fixed effects are included. Mean outcome values in implementing
states before the mandates are shown separately for new and old houses at the bottom of each column. Standard errors clustered at the state level (36 clusters) are
shown in parentheses.
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Table C.15: Tenancy Effects
Dependent Variable:
No 
Controls
Controls
No 
Controls
Controls
No 
Controls
Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Mandate,  -0.025  -0.026  -0.022  -0.020  0.093  0.088
Child <6 (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.045) (0.042)
 0.017  0.031  -0.015  -0.020  -0.021  -0.060 
(0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.048) (0.073)
N 214103 163087 191150 161124 74520 63551
Outcome Mean, Pre-
Period 0.835 0.835 0.343 0.343 6.280 6.280
Old House Rented Log Monthly Rent
Post-Mandate, Youngest 
HH Member >59
Notes: The table presents DD estimates on the AHS sample for the years 1985-2011. Post-mandate dummies are interacted with dummies for "Child below six
years of age" and "Youngest HH Member above 59 years of age". Outcome variables are defined in each column. Rent is expressed in 2006 USD. State-year,
year-household characteristic, state-household characteristic, and month of interview fixed effects are included. Controls include second order polynomials of
household’s income. Mean outcome values in implementing states before the mandates. Standard errors clustered at the state level (36 clusters) are shown in
parentheses.
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